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technical rules of criminal procedure were to be introduced to
the juvenile court system, the
purpose behind the creation of

Wadlow v. State:
PROSECUTION
IS REQUIRED TO
PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE
DOUBT SPECIFIC
FACTORS
NECESSARY FOR
IMPOSITION
OF ENHANCED
SENTENCE.

the juvenile court system in providing a simplified, informal setting in which to better effectuate the rehabilitation and treat-

ment of juveniles would be circumvented and thwarted.
- Timothy Sean Daugherty

In Wadlow v. State, 335
Md. 122, 642 A.2d 213 (1994),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland formally classified enhanced
sentencing requirements as elements of offenses which must
be alleged and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The State cannot rely on
the discretion of the trial court
to conclude that the aggravating factors or quantity necessary to elevate a particular offense have been resolved. Following Wadlow v. State, such a
conclusion may not be reached
by the sentencingjudge, but must
be determined by the trier of
fact.
Lauren Marie Wadlow
was indicted by a Montgomery
County Grand Jury for unlawful
possession with intent to distribute (Count I), simple possession (Count II), and conspiracyto distribute cocaine (Count
III). The charging documents
alleged possession of a certain

quantity of cocaine sufficient to
subject Wadlow to an enhanced
statutory penalty for the possession with intent to distribute
charge. At trial in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, however, the jury had not
been instructed to determine the
exact quantity of cocaine that
the Defendant had possessed
for enhancement purposes.
Nevertheless, the jury found
Wadlow guilty of all three
counts. At sentencing, the simple possession count was
merged into possession with intent to distribute. Wadlow was
then given a four year sentence
for possession with intent to
distribute and a consecutive oneyear sentence for the conspiracy
charge.
At the conclusion ofthe
jury trial, the State filed a motion seeking to correct an illegal
sentence, arguing that the quantity of cocaine seized mandated
imposition of a five year, no

parole sentence, and that the
conspiracy, rather than the simple possession charge, should
merge into the possession with
intent to distribute conviction.
The trial judge, with little explanation, merged the conspiracy
charge and imposed a five year
sentence for possession with
intent to distribute. The trial
judge, however, refused to state
for the record that the revised
sentence had been imposed in
accordance with the increased
penalty provision found within
the possession statute. The State
appealed, insisting that the trial
judge had not followed the statutory enhancement requirement.
Wadlow cross-appealed, arguing that an increased sentence
could only result following a
jury finding of the statutorily
required quantity of cocaine.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that the existence offactors requiring imposition of an increased sentence
must be determined by the trial
judge, not the jury, and that the
trial judge in this case had implicitly made such a finding in
resentencing Wadlow. Accordingly, the court of special appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, but remanded the case
with instructions for the trial
judge to explicitly state that the
resulting sentence had been given based on mandatory enhancement guidelines. Wadlow petitioned the Court of Appeals of
Maryland for a writ of certiorari. The court granted the petition in order to clarity the respective duties of judge and
jury regarding mandatory en-

hanced sentencing provisions.
The court of· appeals
first examined the offenses
charged and the corresponding
Maryland Code references.
Wadlow, 335 Md. at 126, 642
A.2d at 214. Possession with
the intent to distribute (Count I)
was made unlawful by Article
27, Section 286. Id Section
286(a)(1) specifically prohibited the possession of a "controlled dangerous substance in
sufficient quantity to reasonably
indicate . . . an intent to . . .
dispense." Id. In addition,
Section 286(f) provided for enhanced sanctions for violations
of Section 286(a)(1) involving
possession of larger quantities
ofthe controlled dangerous substance.Id. Wadlowwascharged
with unlawfully possessing a
quantity of cocaine that permitted the inference of an intent to
distribute under Section
286(a)(I). Id. at 126, 642 A.2d
at 215. Although the quantity
ofcocaine allegedly in Wadlow's
possession would have qualified for an increased sentence
under § 286(f), the jury had not
been charged with deciding
whether the amount possessed
satisfied the sentencing enhancement provision. Id. The simple
possession, and conspiracy convictions, Counts II and III respectively, were given only brief
consideration by the court of
appeals. Id. at 127, 642 A.2d at
215.
The court primarily focused on the initial and subsequent sentences imposed as a
result ofthe Count I conviction.
Id. at 128,642A.2dat216. The

State argued that the United
States Constitution and federal
courts of appeals both permitted imposition of an enhanced
penalty based on factual determinations made by a sentencing
judge. Id. The court agreed,
but noted that in Maryland such
factual determinations were permissible only in situations where
a defendant's prior conduct was
in question. Id. at 129, 642
A.2d at 216. In the instant case,
the increased sentence depended not on the applicability of
Wadlow's previous convictions,
but upon a possessory offense
with multiple degrees. Id. at
132, 642 A.2d at 218. The
court noted that where the legislature had provided different
sentences for the same offense,
based on a particular variable,
that variable must be treated as
an element ofthe offense. Id. In
the absence of contrary legislativeintent, the prosecution must
allege and prove such circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
The court provided a
useful analogy using the offense
ofmalicious destruction ofproperty. Id. at 130, 642 A.2d at
216. Much like the multiplepunishment scheme of Section
286, the prohibition against destruction of property had also
been separated into varied penalties. Id. While similarly classified as a single offense, the
value of property destroyed
could serve to elevate the particular sanction dispensed. Id.
at 131, 642 A.2d at 217. Appropriately, the court held that
the property value should be
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deemed an element of the offense that the prosecution must
allege and prove. Id. at 132,
642 A.2d .at 217 (citing with
approval Hagans v. State, 316
Md. 429, 559 A.2d 792 (1989)).
Since Section 286 also provided for varied punishments based
upon the quantity ofa controlled
dangerous substance possessed,
the specific quantity is such an
element that the State must allege and prove. Id.
In this case, the State
had not charged Wadlow with a
possessory violation of Section
286(t), only of Section
286(a)(I). Id. at 126, 642 A.2d
at 215. Moreover, contrary to
the accepted judicial treatment
of other multi-faceted offenses,
the jury had not been properly
instructed to make a factual find-
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ing regarding the quantity of
cocaine in Wadlow's possession. Id. at 127, 642 A.2d at
215. Since the sentencing judge
had made such a determination,
the court of appeals held that
the prosecution had neither met
the allegation nor the burden of
proof Id. at 134, 642 A.2d at
218. Wadlow's revised sentencewas therefore vacated and
replaced with the trial judge's
original imposition ofa four year
term of imprisonment. Id.
In Wadlow v. State, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
explicitly held that the quantity
of controlled dangerous substance necessary to activate
Section 286(f)'s enhanced penalty provision was to be treated
as an element of the possessory
offense that must be alleged and

proven beyond a reasonable
doubt by the prosecution. The
State, in meeting its burden of
proof, must persuade the trier
of fact, not the sentencingjudge
of the actual quantity possessed.
This holding prohibits the State
from vaguely charging potential defendants, then seeking
severe, unexpected, mandatory
penalties during the sentencing
phase of trial. The holding also
sets forth the requirement that
the prosecution accurately put
defendants on notice as to the
maximum sanctions that they
may be subjected to upon conviction. The court, by placing
such burdens on the prosecution, implicitly safeguarded individual rights and restrained
future oppressive State conduct.
- Christopher R. Rahl
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